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6 Sex and Race go Pop
Abstract: This chapter examines the question of the relations between media repre-
sentations, their interpretations, and popular cultural practices and attitudes in
relation to them. It begins by stating the centrality of filmic representations to
popular culture today, and moves on to analyse, first, the gendered and sexualised
images as seen in a large proportion of music videos by way of a reading of ‘Ayo
Technology’ by 50 Cent and Justin Timberlake, a reading that uses Laura Mulvey's
hugely influential feminist account of ‘visual pleasure’. Secondly, the chapter
opens its frames of reference to include a consideration of the place of masculinity
and ethnicity in popular cultural discourses, drawing on the work of Rey Chow
and her concept of ‘coercive mimeticism’. Mulvey’s approach was constructed in
film theory and Chow’s notion of coercive mimeticism was constructed in postcolo-
nial studies, but this chapter shows their usefulness and applicability in any analy-
sis of the visual aspects of popular culture.
1 Introduction: cinema as a cultural technology
The connections between mass-mediated forms of popular culture, such as film or
pop music, and matters that could be called political are often difficult to discern.
This is so even though they can be said to be overwhelmingly “visual” matters.
More precisely, they are matters of “representation”, and more specifically still,
matters of representation, which are ineradicably wedded to particular types of
media technology. To elucidate these propositions, this chapter first shows some
of the ways in which cinema and film in general can be shown to be significant
“cultural technologies”, and some of the ways in which they have complex effects
on culture and identity. It then goes on to analyse two music videos in terms of
what they could be said to show us about gender, sexuality, race and ethnicity in
the contemporary media-saturated world.
More and more of the world can be said to be media-saturated. And this is not
a particularly new thing. It is rather that the types of media that are dominant in
different times and places change. The 19th Century was arguably the century of
the dominance of literature and of the British Empire. Literature was the dominant
cultural form; Britain the dominant national force. To the extent that this is the
case, it can also be said that the 20th Century can be regarded as the century of
the United States of America and cinema. The USA emerged as the dominant (or
hegemonic) cultural and economic force and presence, with the cinema as the
dominant cultural form or technology. The complex processes involved are often
distilled into the word “Hollywood”, a term which evokes the global ideological
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hold of the USA and the channelling of that ideology through the film form and
the cinematic apparatus.
We might ask, what then is the 21st Century? Historians of all areas of life
– from culture to economics, from military to market, from language to technol-
ogy – have proposed that the 21st Century seems likely to be the century of China
and the internet. We will have to defer a sustained consideration of the question
of “China”, at this point – although the effects of the changing status of China is
a fascinating question (Chow 1993; Park 2010). Instead, let’s begin our visual cul-
tural analysis from the question: what kind of cultural form or technology is the
internet? As I write these words in 2012 – over 20 years after the birth of the World
Wide Web – the jury is, in fact, still out. Rather than trying to predict the future
by trying to anticipate the cultural significance and development of the Internet,
let us first consider the fate of the older 20th Century cultural technology of film
in the context of the emergence of the Internet.
Some cultural theorists have recently started talking of the transition from a
“cinematic” age to a “post-cinematic” age. Such an idea will doubtless undergo
further revision and elaboration and find a much more precise formulation as time
goes on. But for now, Steven Shaviro’s “Post-Cinematic Affect” (Shaviro 2010) leads
the way in this regard, by engaging with the effects of post-cinematic technologies
on our experiences, orientations, emotions, feelings and lives.
“Post-cinematic” technologies include all that is associated with the rise of
interactivity, gaming, multimedia, and the proliferation of different internet plat-
forms, as well as various new types of text, such as the music video, the new
ways, modes and contexts of experiencing and consuming them and the effects
they have on consciousness and perception. Shaviro considers the rise to domi-
nance of these “post-cinematic” technologies in terms of a transformation of
“affects”: mutations of experiential landscapes, emotional geographies, and per-
ceptual and sensorial ecosystems. Using a famous term developed by the pioneer
of cultural studies, Raymond Williams, (yet developing this term in ways
informed more by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze), Shaviro characterises
this as an epochal transformation in dominant “structures of feeling”. In other
words, the rise of the post-cinematic context has transformed our lives in ways
related to our day-to-day and moment-to-moment experience.
If such post-cinematic technologies have transformed structures of feeling, this
is not the first time this has happened. For instance, we might consider the emer-
gence of cinema itself. Rey Chow opens her 1995 book Primitive Passions (Chow
1995) with a reconsideration of the famous story of the turn towards a writing
career of the monumental figure of Chinese literature, Lu Xun. Whilst he was a
medical student at the very beginning of the 20th Century, Lu Xun watched with
horror the cinema newsreels depicting atrocities committed in the Russo-Japanese
War in Manchuria, including the executions of Chinese people. Lu Xun’s account
of his response to these sights is complex and provocative. Indeed, his response
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to these first cinematic newsreels actually prefigures many of the dominant ques-
tions that have arisen in the face of cinema and other forms of viewing or “passive
consumption” of mass media messages. For instance, Lu Xun asked, how could
the witnesses to executions be so “passive”; how could audiences, of any kind,
“do nothing”; and, more to the point, what could he himself do here and now to
address such wrongs and escape the incapacity and passivity of being nothing but
a viewer?
These first problems, arising very early on in response to the first cinematic
experiences of news reports, arguably set out many of the entrenched problems
associated with the cinema, especially the problem of a sense of incapacity, castra-
tion, helplessness and passivity. Rey Chow’s analysis of Lu Xun’s emotional and
intellectual response is far reaching and immensely important (Chow 1995). But
the point I want to single out and draw attention to here is one that Chow empha-
sises about the significance of the fact that this new technology (the “cinematic”
apparatus) precipitated a peculiar response from Lu Xun: in response to the media
images, he turned away from his chosen career path of medicine and towards
“literature”, believing that he could do more to improve the health of China by
cultural or ideological intervention than by medical intervention.
Central to Chow’s reading of this famous narrative is the following: Xun’s
response to the new cultural technology (cinema) sends him into a relationship
with an “older” technology (literature). From this, Chow proposes that it is possible
to perceive the effects of “cinema” in (and on) Xun’s “literature”. From this point,
one may broaden the perspective and begin to explore the significance of the
emergence of “cinema” within subsequent developments in “literature”. Indeed,
we might even be tempted to regard the majority of 20th Century literature as “post-
cinematic”, in that it is literature produced in a cultural world that the cinematic
apparatus has intervened into – and has in fact dominated and transformed.
In other words, this is the same as to say that after the birth of cinema, litera-
ture could never be the same again. In this sense, Lu Xun’s story is exemplary of
the epochal mutation entailed in the shocks and jolts that are such a central part
of life in modernity. The shock of the new attendant to the emergence of cinema
had effects in untold ways in untold numbers and kinds of context – so much so
that literature itself, in modernity, since the birth of cinema, might best be
regarded as post-cinematic. Of course, this reverses the chronological periodization
and emphasis that organizes Shaviro’s book. For, the idea of the “post-cinematic”
that Shaviro uses in his book is one which points to all that new stuff that comes
“after” cinema: computers, the Internet, the dynamism and interactivity of gaming
or web 2.0; before that, cable and satellite TV, multiple (indeed myriad) television
and radio channels, video, DVD, and all the rest. Nevertheless, as was implicit
even in the very first theorisations of the word “postmodern” by such philosophers
as Jean-François Lyotard, one of the key points about the postmodern is that every-
thing you can say about the features of the “post” are actually already there, at
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the outset, before the emergence of the period of “the post” as such (Lyotard 1984):
so you can see elements of “postmodernity” at the origins (and throughout) the
historical period called “modernity”. Postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard have
long pointed out that the postmodern is implied in and active in the very emer-
gence of the modern, right from the start.
Rey Chow’s reading of Lu Xun’s affective response to these early experiences
of (or encounters with) cinema demonstrates this explicitly. The new technology
intervenes into, informs and thereby transforms the cultural landscape in ways
which have knock on (albeit unpredictable) effects on other forms of cultural pro-
duction and reception. To see this at a basic level, one need merely consider the
extent to which so many literary best-sellers today have clearly been written with
the production requirements of the standard Hollywood film form firmly in mind.
This is but one register of the hegemony or dominance of the cinematic form and
its “hegemonization” even of other cultural realms, such as literature.
In any case, Shaviro argues that contemporary cultural conditions are such that
the cinematic epoch is coming to a close. We are now at the end(s) of the cinematic.
This is being registered “within” cinema, even though cinema remains strongly
influential across all of its inheritors – all of the new technologies that are taking
cinematic technologies forward in new directions. This is why the times are to be
regarded as “post-cinematic” and not “anti” or “non-cinematic”. Cinema is on the
wane while other technological forms are on the rise, just as the USA is on the wane
in terms of its global hegemony, while China is on the rise in terms of economic
and military strength. Thus, gaming, all things interactive, the music video, and
other new arrivals on the audio-visual technological scene, all remain hugely
informed by cinematography, but they move away from its technological limitations.
Meanwhile, cinema attempts to incorporate the new technological advance-
ments within itself: from DVD menus, extras, commentaries, outtakes, integrated
marketing strategies with other realms (gaming, animation, toys and merchandise,
spin off series) and other supplements, all the way to the inclusion of forms of
interactivity that ultimately signal the demise of the older form. According to this
perspective, films like Blade Runner (1982) or S1m0ne (2002) are not post-cin-
ematic, whilst The Matrix (1999) or even the Korean film Old Boy (2003) are. The
former are films “about” future technologies, whilst the latter “incorporate” future
technologies into themselves, insofar as both films famously affect the styles of
computer simulated choreographies in their most famous fight scenes, albeit in
different ways: The Matrix employs the sharpness and precision of arcade game
fights, whilst Old Boy incorporates the two-dimensional plane of older forms of
computer game, but it counterbalances this with the inclusion of all of the scrappi-
ness, imprecision, stumbling, gasping, moaning and, indeed, “messy brawling”
that almost all action films exclude or repress (as exemplified by the ultra-precise
choreography of The Matrix or The Bourne Identity trilogy (2002, 2004, 2007)).
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2 What’s the big deal about cinema? Or: what does
cinema “do”?
2.1 Case study 1: activity, passivity, gender and sexuality
Now, whether post-cinematic or classically cinematic, one important question is
that of what the cinema “does”, or what the cinematic apparatus “does”: what
effects this type of media has on people, what difference it makes to culture and
society. As already indicated, one abiding argument made especially by Marxist
thinkers is that the cinema makes us “passive” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986).
Some thinkers have been concerned that societies dominated primarily by the
imposition of viewing relations, in which we’re all spectators, not only make us
passive but actually make us acquiescent to or even enthusiastic for the worst
kinds of political power. In the worst cases we can become enthusiastic for popu-
list or fascist dictators who exploit the cinematic apparatus to make us think that
they are charismatic, wise, authoritative, avuncular or loveable father figures or
suchlike. (The film theorist Bazin argued that this manipulation of cinematic
effects was the root of Stalin’s success in the Soviet Union.) At the very least, it is
clear that we can have our heart-strings plucked by formulaic and clichéd devices
of emotional or affective manipulation.
The cover of Guy Debord’s classic, The Society of the Spectacle – one of the
most influentially pessimistic Marxist texts about the effects of a media saturated
society – has an image of rows of transfixed viewers sitting in a cinema, all facing
towards the screen, all equally and identically enthralled. This has become one of
the defining images of the positions which see a media saturated society as one
which produces passivity, not only in audiences but effectively in everyone
(Debord 1994).
But this argument about passivity, docility or plasticity is not the end of the
story about cinematic effects. One of the most influential analyses of the ideologi-
cal effects of the cinematic apparatus was set out by Laura Mulvey in 1975. In an
essay entitled Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (Mulvey 1975), Mulvey uses
psychoanalytic (not Marxist) theory to argue that “the unconscious of patriarchal
society has structured film form”. Specifically, she argues, the regular repeated
“image of the castrated woman [is used by Hollywood film] to give order and
meaning to its world”. The men fight for the woman. They fight over the woman.
The drama circles around the woman. So, “woman” is “tied to her place as bearer
of meaning”, but she is not the “maker of meaning”. The woman is objectified.
She is the motive force of the action, but she is essentially excluded from it. Specif-
ically, argues Mulvey, in classic Hollywood, woman is the object of the gaze. She
is there “to be looked at”. And this has significant implications, she argues. For it
clarifies the extent to which filmic and other media images work to reinforce patri-
archal, sexist or misogynistic ideologies.
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Fig. 1: Woman “to-be-looked-at”, in the music video for “Ayo Technology” by Justin Timberlake
and Fifty Cent”.1
A clear example of what Mulvey calls the classic effect of such a style can be
seen in many pop music videos. Perhaps the best, to my knowledge, is that of the
video for the song “Ayo Technology”, performed by Justin Timberlake and Fifty
Cent. In this video, set in London, we see the male performers play ersatz James
Bond characters. However, although they are slick-suited and sporting various
forms of weaponry and technological gadgets, like Bond, they are not spying on
villains, criminals, terrorists, or other stock kinds of antihero; rather they are spy-
ing on various female characters. Early shots in the video see them looking
through night vision goggles and peering through the sights of large guns at
women who are scantily clad and, in unusual locations, performing strangely
incongruous erotic dances. An early moment sees Fifty Cent spying through a gun-
sight from a rooftop, looking down at a girl dressed only in her underwear and
high heels as she gets into a sports car.
Other scenes see Timberlake spying through binoculars from a chauffeur-
driven car at a woman who is writhing in underwear, back-lit, in silhouette, in the
window of a city flat or apartment. Later on in the video, Timberlake and Fifty Cent
also appear to command futuristic sci-fi-like technologies, which can evidently act
on women at a distance: Fifty Cent controls a virtual computer akin to the device
 http://music.yahoo.com/blogs/framed/archive/22.html.
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that Tom Cruise uses to see events with omniscience in Minority Report (2002). For
Tom Cruise’s police officer character in the movie, the computer functions to help
him master imponderable amounts of data and to perform calculations that
attempt to predict the future. Fifty Cent, however, uses a similar-looking device in
such a way as to make women become sexually aroused.
Eventually, the video devolves down to the protagonists entering a private or
luxury and exclusive lap-dancing club. This has all the hallmarks of a traditional
upper-class London “gentleman’s club”, plus strippers. At this point, we see the
male protagonists enjoy lap-dances whilst they themselves are blindfolded, as if
inverting the original form of pleasure: at the start of the video, the men enjoy
the scopophilia of looking and desiring. By the end, in contrast to the common
understanding of the etiquette of lap-dancing establishments, in which customers
can typically look but not touch, the males, in being blindfolded, are evidently
now allowed to touch. Apparently, being blindfold will enhance this experience for
them. (This scene is intercut with other scenes in which Timberlake also appears
elsewhere: erotic scenes on the stairways, in the doorways and on the landings of
a residential apartment building.)
There is much that could be said about such a video, and many others like it.
From the perspective offered by Laura Mulvey, the video first illustrates the desir-
ing, objectifying, controlling aspirations of “the male gaze”. The male gaze is a
voyeuristic, “scopophilic”, controlling gaze, she argues. It is a sexualised and sex-
ualising gaze. It literally “targets” the female form and objectifies it. In this case,
the gun-sight through which Fifty Cent spies is clearly a phallic image. The gun
targets the woman, and the act of sighting the women is in itself an enactment of
power. He could easily “shoot”. He could easily “take” her. He feels in control.
The decision is in his hands. In a sense, therefore, he is already in control, by
virtue of his viewing position.
Similarly, the night-vision binoculars used by Timberlake confer upon the
screen the green tint that has been associated (in film and television, in news, fact
and fiction) not only with security cameras and military weapons, but also with
the visual look of various much-publicised celebrities’ private/personal porno-
graphic sex tapes. Many of these came to light at around the same time as this
music video. The Paris Hilton sex tapes are perhaps the most famous (and perhaps
most cruel) example of a rash of “private” sex videos to emerge around that time.
Moreover, at these points, the camera angle changes to that of a hand-held private
or amateur video, which emphasises the pornographic allusions. (This song, “Ayo
Technology”, was reputedly first titled “Ayo Pornography”, but the decision was
taken to rename it and change the lyrics accordingly because the word “pornogra-
phy” would damage its ability to receive prime time TV and radio airplay, and
hence maximise sales and revenues.)
 http://www.wired.com/underwire/2007/08/50-cent-and-jus/.
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Fig. 2: Fifty Cent strangely blindfolded in a lap-dance club – as if the women who are employed
to be looked at are not desirable to him, or need not be looked at; implying that “the most”
desirable women are those who have to be spied on.2
So, the video performs a certain male fantasy of desire, control and sexualising
objectification. At the same time as this, and in a way that is entirely consistent
with Mulvey’s argument, the video depicts women as reciprocally (or perhaps even
primarily) performing for a male gaze – and, crucially, even when a literal male
gaze is not normally assumed to be present. The case of the female figure writhing
at the window is the clearest example. For, via this scenario, the video seems to
suggest, this is precisely the way that beautiful women will behave when they
undress; that even when they believe themselves to be home alone and even when
they are simply changing their clothes, they are still basically “asking for it”.
The idea of identity as “performance” – that is, as something that is not simply
natural or inevitable, but is rather a culturally obligatory performance – was per-
haps most widely popularized in the arguments of the early work of Judith Butler.
Butler’s arguments have since become widely accepted – to a greater or lesser
extent – in cultural and media studies (as well as the humanities more widely). It
is a perspective that has significant implications for what we might call the politics
of media and culture – for part of the argument is that we learn how to “perform”,
how to “be”, from what we “see”.
02.08.2013   12:54:14
Sex and Race go Pop 161
Fig. 3: The male gaze is controlling, patriarchal, objectifying and “targeting”.3
There are many implications and ramifications here. The video reiterates a
version of masculinity as gaze and femininity as “to-be-looked-at-ness” – or male
as controlling and female as controlled. With the lyrical repetition of “oh, she
wants it, oh, I’m gonna give it to her”, and similar sentiments, it repeats the
misogynistic perspective that women are “asking for it”. But, the question then
becomes one of “our agency” in front of the text. Or in other words: once we see
that the text is patriarchal, misogynistic and sexist, the question is, does that mean
that the viewer will be or become patriarchal, misogynistic and sexist? Is the
viewer “passive”? Does the filmic text manipulate us the way that the virtual tech-
nology used by Fifty Cent in the video manipulates the woman?
I am reluctant to propose that the watching of videos, films, TV or other media,
is going to generate a case of “monkey see, monkey do”. In other words, I am not
proposing that such videos in and of themselves cause or deepen misogyny or
patriarchy. However, this is certainly a possibility that needs to be entertained.
For, according to the implications of Mulvey’s approach, what such texts do is
that they “normalise” these patriarchal viewing relations: we – male and female –
become “used to” (habituated, acclimatised) viewing the world this way, to appre-
hending the female as body, as object, as sex, and to regarding the male as power-
 http://music.yahoo.com/blogs/framed/archive/22.html.
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ful, controlling, gazing; we get used to regarding the woman as “wanting” to
masquerade and “perform” her femininity as her sexuality for the male gaze, etc.
Another clear example of this can be seen in many Beyoncé songs and videos,
in which apparently “feminist” sentiments are uttered – declarations about “inde-
pendence” and “strength”, for instance, which might at first glance seem to be
feminist. But the problem is that these sentiments emerge within songs which are
otherwise entirely organised by the performance of desire for a man. One song,
which claims to celebrate strong independent femininity, nevertheless repeats the
phrase “if you like[d] it then you should have put a ring on it”. In other words,
the song is organised by a kind of bitterness – a bitterness about and a desire for
male commitment. Such resentment hardly seems to be a feminist sentiment, or
even the sentiment of a truly “free” and “independent” person. Rather, in this
performance, we see a combination of contradictory sentiments which show that
the celebration of independence is in fact a grudging resentful response to the
disappointment elicited when the (absent) male refused to “put a ring on it” – i.e.,
to commit, to get engaged or married. To this extent, all the words about “femi-
nism” or “strength” in the song are a mere replaying of the most patriarchal of
assumptions or stereotypes about males and females: that men will not commit,
and that all women really want is a man.
Many other of Beyoncé’s “feminist” or “post-feminist” songs replay this logic:
the character who frantically performs her desire through myriad costume changes
and insanely energetic erotic performances in front of an entirely stationary and
unresponsive “cool” male character; or the woman who ditches her partner because
he is not up to scratch, singing about how she will be “over you in a minute” and
that she will have “another [one of] you in a minute” – all of which confirm that
ultimately what is desired is standard patriarchal heterosexual domesticity.
But just because these popular cultural media texts are evidently patriarchal,
sexist and “heteronormative” (in that they reiterate the message that heterosexual
norms are both the standard and the objective), does this mean “either” that we
are passive before such texts “or” that we ourselves will “become” patriarchal,
sexist and heteronormative ourselves by virtue of our exposure to them?
There are many approaches to culture and identity which propose that we may
“become” what we are exposed to. However, many of these are simplistic (or
indeed what is termed “essentialist”), in that they propose a kind of “monkey see,
monkey do” relationship between what (certain types of) people are exposed to
and what they will do – especially if they “enjoy” what they see. And, it is impor-
tant to note, we may well enjoy Beyoncé’s or Timberlake’s videos, and for any
number of reasons: we may find the beat irresistible; we may be enthralled by the
faces and bodies in the videos; or the sheer complexity and rapidity of the flashing
and changing scenes in a music video may be compelling. But does our enjoyment
make us a prisoner or a puppet? The situation is surely more complex.
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2.2 Segue: the commodification of sex and ethnicity
Bell hooks once provided an interesting account of the problems of rap, hip hop
music and black youth identity in the 1980s and early 90s. Hip hop was arguably
one of the main contexts in which black youth culture gained anything like cul-
tural visibility and prominence. During the 1990s and up to the early 2000s, hip
hop and rap could actually be said to have utterly transformed mainstream popu-
lar music and global popular culture in myriad ways. But there was a problem at
the heart of it. According to hooks, the black rapper character and the hip hop
music video style became entangled with a damaging image of blackness.
The logic, according to hooks, is that of a vicious circle. The circle is this: first,
hip hop gains prominence as a nominally black musical genre. It is associated
with poor black youth and also with anger and protest. It is organised by a connec-
tion with “the street”. This all gives hip hop and rap a strong identity. But it also
becomes a cliché, a stereotype, a cheap commodity. It becomes another way of
defining the black: angry, dangerous, poor, politicized, apparently aggressive,
often violent. Over time, sexuality comes to the fore too. Black rap and hip hop
videos (along with white spin offs and related enterprises) increasingly involve the
tried and tested marketing device of always including sexy female “eye candy”.
So what becomes produced is a genre which can all too easily act as a stand in
for black culture per se. This genre – and this interpretation of what black culture
“is” – becomes reduced to violence, guns, money and girls.
Now, what hooks proposes is not that “people” (viewers, listeners) simply
“change” and “become” more violent or more sexist. Rather, it is that certain
generic and formulaic rules, certain sorts of lyrics, types of imagery and styles of
video (involving guns, girls and money) gain a dominance and act as a kind of
stranglehold. To be a success, artists perceive that the easy – or the only – route
is to produce texts and performances that now conform to this new norm. In other
words, what Adorno and Horkheimer called “the culture industry” produces cul-
tural and media effects, effects which play themselves out in people’s daily lives,
fantasies and desires.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of bell hooks’ arguments and insights,
the media are not simply “external” to us. The audiovisual media texts that perme-
ate everyday popular culture are not simply fictional or fake, with no relation to
our hearts and minds, our actions and inactions. As all of the foregoing discus-
sions have implied, audiovisual media texts are potentially hugely important vis-
à-vis individual and collective identity-formation. To see this, let us turn to another
concise media text – a text which, so to speak, dramatizes in a hyperbolic and
comic way the effects on identity of attractive media images. What the text lacks
in seriousness, it more than makes up for in providing a thought-provoking sce-
nario about identity.
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2.3 Case study 2: ethnicity, sexuality, identity and coercive
mimeticism
The text I want to focus on here is the music video for the song “Pretty Fly for a
White Guy” (Offspring 1998). It is a comic and frivolous text – both in the lyrical
content and in the video. But what it explores and dramatizes is both recognizable
and serious, and raises some fundamental questions about identity, desire and
phantasy.
The song is structured by the refrain “all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a
white guy”. In the video, these words are uttered by a white “wannabe”. The lyrics
narrate the tale – or rather, the situation – the plight – of an apparently affluent,
suburban white American teenager, a teenager who nevertheless fantasizes about
and evidently fetishizes edgy nonwhite ethnicity. In the video, we see several of
the scenarios which define his phantasy. Whether black African-American or Lat-
ino, our eponymous “white guy” wannabe wants-to-be “that”: he identifies “with”,
he fantasizes “as” that. He wants to be one of “them”. Unfortunately, what is
absolutely clear here is that the one thing he is not is “pretty fly”. Rather, he is
presented as ridiculous, a fool, utterly lacking in self-awareness or self-knowl-
edge – living, as the lyrics put it, “in denial”.
So, the song is all about getting it wrong, wanting the impossible, and denying
that impossibility. The reason for wanting the impossible boils down to a phan-
tasy.5 This is dramatized in the call-and-response (and commentary) that opens
and permeates the song. The song opens with it: a female chorus chant “Give it
to me baby”. In the video, our hapless hero responds in the affirmative. This call
and response is repeated. It is a chant of female call and male response that
dramatizes what is evidently a male sexual phantasy about specifically ethnic
female desire. It is followed by the gravelly-voiced claim: “And all the girlies say
I’m pretty fly for a white guy”, whereupon the song “proper” begins. This, it soon
becomes clear, is the structuring fantasy (or “phantasy”) of our misrecognizing,
fantasising white guy. This is what he wants. This is what he thinks it would be
like if only he were the ethnic he wants to be. This is what he wants to see and
hear. He imagines the call. He “performs” a response. So, in the video representa-
tion, the song runs: repeated female chant (“Give it to me baby”); he answers (“uh
huh, uh huh”). This is followed by the voice of his phantasy, which asserts his
conviction that “all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a white guy”.
 http://uk.viva.tv/musik/artists/the-offspring-209023/videos.
 I use the “ph” spelling here to highlight the psychoanalytic/cultural theoretical specificity of
this usage. The “ph” spelling is more likely to be used in British-English rather than American-
English academic contexts in any case. However, elsewhere I use the “f” spelling, usually where
the “ph” spelling would appear awkward, but also where psychoanalytic specificity is not neces-
sary.
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Fig. 4: Opening moments of the video for “Pretty Fly for a White Guy”.4
After this intro, we are “counted-in” in incorrect Spanish (“Uno, dos, tres,
cuatro, cinco, cinco, seis”). If we had been in any doubt up until now, this mis-
count – this moment of getting it just a bit but fundamentally wrong – not quite
getting the Spanish right – clarifies things for us. This is a joke. This is about
misrecognition, getting it wrong. Moreover, the girls in the video are clearly non-
existent fantasy constructions: there never were girls thronging around him on the
way to his car, by the side of the road, or covered in glittering paint by the pool.
They are entirely his phantasy.
An initial assessment of the song, taking into account any mirth it might pro-
duce – and the extent to which we might share, understand, or “get” the joke –
suggests that this popular cultural text is saying something quite precise about
identity, about “cultural” identity, “identity performativity” and ethnicity. And this
appears to be something quite different from what is widely supposed to be held
by many thinkers, from Judith Butler to Homi Bhabha and beyond. For, the text
is saying at least one, or perhaps all, of the following: 1.) that a white ethnic
cannot – or should not – try to “perform” another ethnic identity; 2.) that trying
to be other than white for the white is ridiculous; 3.) that trying to do or to be so
is premised on “not getting it”, on “denial”; 4.) that white ethnicity is not like
other ethnicities – not porous, not dilutable, not “hybridisable” or “fragile;” and
5.) that the only compensation for the sadness and disappointment that this might
cause for our wannabe is the contemporary Confessional: “At least you know you
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can always go on Ricki Lake”, say the lyrics. Indeed, don’t worry, be happy, add
The Offspring: “the world needs wannabes”. So, “hey, hey, do the brand new
thing”.
The song is very clear on this. After staging the fantasy scenario, after being
miscounted-in, the narrative voice begins to tell us all about it. The lyrics begin
by addressing us in terms of a shared lot, a common problem that we all recognise:
“You know it’s kinda hard just to get along today”. “We all know this”, right?
Furthermore: “Our subject isn’t cool, but he thinks it anyway”. Isn’t this a familiar
story? How many of us are guilty of it ourselves? We may recall Lacan’s contention
that, in love, “You never look at me from the place from which I see you”. Con-
versely, “what I look at is never what I wish to see” (Lacan quoted in Chow 1998:
81). Moreover, as Rey Chow points out, this “dialectic of eye and gaze” need not
be “literally” intersubjective; a man may fall “in love, not with a woman or even
with another man, not with a human being at all but with a thing, a reified form
of his own fantasy” (1998: 78). As The Offspring put it: “He may not have a clue,
and he may not have style / But everything he lacks, well he makes up in denial”.
Is this his problem: “denial”? “Denial” is surely the most abused, misused,
bandied-about psychobabblistic term ever. Everyone, it seems risks living in
denial. Overcoming denial is indeed an abiding concern of an enormous range of
popular cultural texts and discourses. But, if denial is deemed to be the problem,
what is deemed to be the solution? The popular answer is: come to terms, recog-
nize, accept. But how? By talking about yourself; by “confessing”. Go on Ricki
Lake. Even if you are “fake”, you “can” have a moment of real-world, recognized,
“authentic” success (“fame”), by coming clean, by confessing, publicly: the only
authentic redemption in a world which thrives on the production of fakes and
wannabes, say The Offspring.
If we can laugh at all of this it is also because we can recognize all of this.
According to the implications of the argument of Michel Foucault in The History
of Sexuality, Volume 1 (Foucault 1978), this familiarity and recognisability comes
from the fact that The Offspring song plays with the material thrown up by and
circulating in and as a discursive constellation – a very old discursive constella-
tion, says Foucault, which came together in the 18th Century. In this discursive
formation, the terms ethnicity, identity, authenticity and autobiography – or con-
fession – encounter each other in an overdetermined chiasmus. In it, whenever
issues of identity and ethnicity arise as a (self-reflexive, “personal”) problem, this
discursive constellation proposes that the route out is via the self-reflexive side-
door of autobiographical (self) confession.
There is more to this than observing that engaging with ethnicity requires an
engagement with one’s own identity, one that ought to lead into a searching self-
interrogation and ideally a deconstruction of questions of authenticity and autobi-
ography – although this is certainly a part of it. For the Foucauldian point is that
precisely such discourses of the self, especially in terms of the brands of self-
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referentiality that nowadays feed chat shows like Ricki Lake, can be seen to have
emerged decisively in modernity. And they emerged with an attending argument
about self-referentiality’s subversive relation to power and its emancipatory rela-
tion to truth. That is, it refers us to the implications of Foucault’s argument about
what he called “the repressive hypothesis” – namely, that almost irresistible belief
that power tries to silence us and demands our silence (Foucault 1978: 18; Chow
2002: 114). As Foucault argued, however, almost the exact opposite is the case. Or
rather, even if there are places where power demands silence or discipline, these
are more than matched by an exponential explosion and proliferation of dis-
courses – in this case, discourses about the self.
These discourses include arguments about self-referentiality’s subversive rela-
tion to power and its emancipatory relation to truth, which relates to the Enlight-
enment idea that an introspective turn to the self is emancipatory: the ingrained
idea (whose prehistory is the Catholic Confessional, and whose contemporary min-
isters Foucault finds in the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst) that seeking to speak
the truth of oneself is the best method of getting at our essential truth “and” the
best way to resist power. Similarly, modern literary self-referentiality emerged with
an attending discourse of resistance – a discourse which regarded literature “as
such” as resistance to the instrumentalization of technical and bureaucratic lan-
guage, first and foremost. And, by the same token, self-referentiality emerged as
an apparently ideal solution to the knotty problem of representing others. For,
how do you represent others truthfully, adequately, ethically? The answer given
here is: “you” don’t. “They” should represent themselves. Here, the self-reflexivity
of self-referentiality is regarded not as apartheid but as the way to bypass the
problems of representing others – by throwing the option open for everyone to
speak the truth of themselves.
However, in Foucault”s phrase: “the “Enlightenment”, which discovered the
liberties, also invented the disciplines” (Foucault 1977: 222; see also Chow 2002:
113). In other words, the desire to refer to the self, to discuss the self, to produce
the self discursively, the impulse to indulge in autobiography and confession, can
be regarded as a consequence of disciplinarity. Psychiatry demands that we reveal
our selves. As does psychoanalysis, as do ethnographic focus groups, as do corpo-
rate marketing focus groups, not to mention the Confessional, the criminologist
and Ricki Lake. And so on. Autobiography and confession are only resistance if
power truly tries to repress the production of discourse. Which it doesn’t – at least
not everywhere.
The point is, autobiography and confession are genealogically wedded – if not
welded – to recognisable disciplinary protocols and – perhaps most significantly –
proceed according to the terms of recognisable metanarratives. Thus, says Chow:
When minority individuals think that, by referring to themselves, they are liberating them-
selves from the powers that subordinate them, they may actually be allowing such powers to
work in the most intimate fashion – from within their hearts and souls, in a kind of voluntary
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surrender that is, in the end, fully complicit with the guilty verdict that has been declared on
them socially long before they speak. (Chow 2002: 115)
Of course, in thinking about postcoloniality, ethnicity, social semiotics and cultural
politics, it is very difficult “not” to think about oneself. Indeed, even in full knowl-
edge of Foucault, there remains something of a complex “imperative” to do so,
even (perhaps especially) if, like me, one does not have a blatantly postcolonial
ethnicity in the classic sense – even if, that is, like me, one has an entirely hege-
monic socio-cultural identity: an ethnicity without ethnicity, as it were; the “hege-
mon” of a hegemony; that is, the “norm”. For, surely one must factor oneself into
whatever picture one is painting, in terms of the “institutional investments that
shape [our own] enunciation” (Chow 1993: 2). Indeed, suggests Chow:
the most difficult questions surrounding the demarcation of boundaries implied by ‘seeing’
have to do not with positivistic taxonomic juxtapositions of self-contained identities and tradi-
tions in the manner of ‘this is you’ and ‘that is us’, but rather, who is ‘seeing’ whom, and
how? What are the power relationships between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of the culturally
overdetermined ‘eye’? (Chow 1991: 3)
Might acknowledging as much make “me” pretty fly for a white guy? As thinkers
like Robyn Wiegman and Rey Chow have pointed out:
the white subject who nowadays endeavors to compensate for the historical ‘wrong’ of being
white by taking on politically correct agendas (such as desegregation) and thus distancing
himself from his own ethnic history, is seldom if ever accused of being disloyal to his culture;
more often than not, he tends to be applauded for being politically progressive and morally
superior. (Chow 2002: 116–117)
Chow proposes that we compare and contrast this with nonwhite ethnic subjects –
or rather, in her discussion, with nonwhite ethnic critics, scholars and academics.
These subjects, she argues are pressured directly and indirectly to behave “prop-
erly” – to act and think and “be” the way “they” are supposed to act and think
and be, “as” nonwhite ethnic academic subjects. If they forget their ethnicity, or
their nationalistically or geographically – and hence essentialistically and positiv-
istically – defined “cultures” and “heritages”, such subjects are deemed to be sell-
outs, traitors – “inauthentic”. But, says Chow, if such an ethnic scholar “should
[…] choose, instead, to mimic and perform her own ethnicity” – that is, to respond
or perform in terms of the implicit and explicit hailing or interpellation of her as
an ethnic subject as such, by playing along with the “mimetic enactment of the
automatized stereotypes that are dangled out there in public, hailing the ethnic”
(2002: 110) – “she would still be considered a turncoat, this time because she is
too eagerly pandering to the orientalist tastes of Westerners” (2002: 117), and this
time most likely by other nonwhite ethnic subjects.
Thus, the ethnic subject seems damned if she does and damned if she doesn’t
“be” an ethnic subject. Of course, this damnation comes from different parties,
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and with different implications. But, in any eventuality, Chow’s point is that, in
sharp contradistinction, “however far he chooses to go, a white person sympa-
thetic to or identifying with a nonwhite culture does not in any way become less
white” (2002: 117). Indeed, she claims:
When it comes to nonwhite peoples doing exactly the same thing […] – that is, becoming
sympathetic to or identified with cultures other than their own – we get a drastically different
kind of evaluation. If an ethnic critic should simply ignore her own ethnic history and become
immersed in white culture, she would, needless to say, be deemed a turncoat (one that forgets
her origins). (Chow 2002: 117)
It is important to be aware that it is not just whites who pressure the nonwhite
ethnic to conform. Chow gives many examples of the ways that scholars of Chinese
culture and literature, for instance, relentlessly produce an essentialist notion of
China, which is used to berate modern diasporic Chinese (and their cultural pro-
ductions). This essentialism takes the form of evoking an essence “that none can
live up to”, precisely because “they are alive” and as such contaminated, diluted,
tainted or corrupted by non-Chinese influences.
At least one side of this key difference between the white and the nonwhite is
dramatized in the Offspring song. Whilst postcolonial critics often recount cases
in which nonwhite ethnic subjects are pressured directly and indirectly to start to
behave “properly” – to act and think and be the way “they” are supposed to
act and think and be as nonwhite ethnic subjects – in other words, to be both
“interpellated”, in Althusser’s sense, and disciplined, in Foucault’s sense – I think
that the very intelligibility of the Offspring song and its fairly unequivocal condem-
nation of the white-wannabe-nonwhite suggests that the white guy who shows too
much interest in nonwhite culture, rather than being “applauded for being politi-
cally progressive and morally superior”, can quite easily and will quite frequently
be deemed not only “disloyal to his culture” but ridiculous. “Yet, he remains no
less white”. In fact, it seems, “he can become no less white”. But he is still a
traitor. Thus, corroborating Chow’s thesis, white ethnicity is here presented as
absolutely immovable and essentially (or wholly/holy) incorruptible.
All of this, Rey Chow calls “coercive mimeticism” (2002: 107). Coercive mimeti-
cism designates the way in which the interpellating, disciplining forces of all dif-
ferent kinds of discourses and institutions “call” us into place, “tell” us our place,
and work to “keep” us in our place. As Chow writes of the ethnic academic subject:
Her only viable option seems to be that of reproducing a specific version of herself – and her
ethnicity – that has, somehow, already been endorsed and approved by the specialists of her
culture (Chow 2002: 117)
Accordingly, coercive mimeticism ultimately works as “an institutionalized mecha-
nism of knowledge production and dissemination, the point of which is to manage
a non-Western ethnicity through the disciplinary promulgation of the supposed
difference”. (2002: 117)
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As we see through the Offspring song, this disciplinary mechanism extends
far beyond the disciplines proper, far beyond the university. In Chow’s words:
unlike the white man, who does not have to worry about impairing his identity even when he
is touched by a foreign culture, the ethnic must work hard to keep hers; yet the harder she
works at being bona fide, the more of an inferior representation she will appear to be. (Chow
2002: 124)
Reciprocally, we might add, the harder the white guy tries to be nonwhite, the
“more” white he will appear. In trying to be other – so say the interpellating
voices, tropes, discourses and institutions – he is of course, just being “silly”.
Whether this means that the white attempt to be like the other is silly, or that the
other is silly – or both – is debatable. What is not debatable is that in all cases
“authenticity” ultimately translates as a hypothetical state of non-self-conscious
and non-constructed essential “being”. The fact that this is an essentialism that is
essentially impossible does not mean that it does not “happen;” rather it means
that “ethnicity” becomes an infinitely supple rhetorical tool. It is available (to
anyone and everyone) as a way to disparage both anyone who is not being the
way they are supposed to be and anyone who “is” being the way they “are” sup-
posed to be.
As Chow explains, “ethnicity can be used as a means of attacking others, of
shaming, belittling, and reducing them to the condition of inauthenticity, disloy-
alty, and deceit” (2002: 124). Ironically, such attacks are “frequently issued by
ethnics themselves against fellow ethnics, that is, the people who are closest to,
who are most like them ethnically in this fraught trajectory of coercive mimeticism”
(2002: 124). What this means is that the most contempt, from all quarters, will
always be reserved for he or she who does not stay in their place, play their proper
ethnicity. All too often, criticism is levelled “individually”, as if it is a “personal”
issue, “despite the fact that this historically charged, alienating situation is a col-
lectively experienced one” (2002: 124). Such is the disciplining, streaming, classify-
ing force of coercive mimeticism. Such are the “uses of ethnicity”.
In the words of Etienne Balibar: “the problem is to keep ‘in their place’, from
generation to generation, those who have no fixed place; and for this, it is neces-
sary that they have a genealogy” (Balibar quoted in Chow 2002: 95). As such,
even the work of sensitive, caring, deeply invested specialists, and expert ethnic
scholars – even ethnic experts in ethnicity – themselves can function to reinforce
ethnicized hierarchies, structured in dominance, simply by insisting on producing
their field or object in its difference. What is at stake here is the surely significant
fact that even the honest and principled or declared aim of studying others other-
wise can actually amount to a positive working for the very forces one avowedly
opposes or seeks to resist.
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3 Conclusion: Visible space and/as power
The two case studies discussed above may seem very different. One focused on
gender performativity and the force of “the male gaze”. The other focused on
issues around the performance of ethnicity. But both are unified in what they
reveal about the visual field’s relation to power. If these case studies indicate
anything, it is the extent to which the space of visual media is steeped in power
relations. There are codes of propriety in gender and ethnic performance – and
even where one might least expect it, such as in the supposedly irreverent
(con)texts of popular music videos. In other words, although our case studies took
us far and wide – from Hollywood to the Internet, from 19th Century British coloni-
alism and imperialism to 20th Century Chinese literature, from the semi-porno-
graphic codes of a contemporary pop video to the irony of some late 20th Century
rock/pop, via complex poststructuralist theory – each reading pointed to the con-
clusion that the visual and performative space of popular culture is saturated with
power, power that cajoles and coerces us to identify with this and to disidentify
with that, and to “perform” ourselves according to the dictates of dominant cul-
tural discourses about gender and ethnicity.
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